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Abstract
While exports within NAFTA face a lower hazard of ceasing, its onset has
increased the hazard for Mexican and U.S. intra NAFTA exports. Intra NAFTA
exports still enjoy a lower hazard relative to exports to non–members. While
NAFTA did aﬀect the hazard for Canada’s exports in the short run, its eﬀect on
Mexican and U.S. exports is persistent. Exports of IRS manufacturing products
face the highest hazard in the case of Canada and Mexico, while IRS natural
resource products have the highest hazard for Mexico. The eﬀect of NAFTA
on the returns to scale product types is exporter speciﬁc.
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1 Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) expanded the Canadian U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) to include Mexico. One argument in favor of
CUSFTA was the well known source of welfare gains in trade models incorporating
economies of scale—namely that tariﬀ–free access to the large U.S. market will allow
Canadian ﬁrms to expand production, take advantage of economies of scale, and
increase productivity resulting in welfare gains for both producers and consumers.
Treﬂer’s (2004) inﬂuential work has shown that the eﬀect of CUSFTA was precisely
as predicted by economy of scale models. CUSFTA initiated a contraction of low
productivity plants resulting in a 12 percent decrease in employment, but also ushered
a period of rising labor productivity increasing it by 15 percent.
Creation and expansion of free trade areas create new opportunities for ﬁrms to
begin exporting their products. Little attention has been paid to NAFTA’s eﬀect on
the ability of NAFTA members’ ﬁrms to successfully maintain their exports to the
NAFTA area. The goal of this paper is to assess the eﬀect NAFTA has had on the
hazard exports ceasing for the three member countries and to assess whether the eﬀect
of NAFTA is related to returns to scale in production, given one of the arguments in
favor of NAFTA was rooted in returns to scale. I use annual exports disaggregated
at the 6-digit Harmonized Schedule level between 1990 and 2007 for Canada, Mexico,
and the United States.
The eﬀect of CUSFTA/NAFTA on productivity is one aspect of the agreements
to have been investigated. Treﬂer (2004) showed that Canadian industries that ex-
perienced the largest tariﬀ cuts enjoyed largest productivity gains. Romalis (2007)
shows that the two free trade agreements have had a substantial eﬀect on the vol-
ume of trade, but a much smaller eﬀect on prices and welfare. Much work has been
devoted to identifying whether CUSFTA and NAFTA were trade creating or divert-
ing. Clausing (2001) found that CUSFTA was primarily trade creating, while Treﬂer
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(2004) found evidence of both trade diversion and trade creation, with creation the
dominant force. Romalis (2007) raised the possibility of a substantial trade diversion
eﬀect of NAFTA/CUSFTA which may be responsible for increased North American
output and prices in once highly protected sectors.
Other researchers have focused on the eﬀects of NAFTA/CUSFTA on the exten-
sive margin. Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) found that especially in cases of thin trade
relationships, such as between Canada and Mexico prior to NAFTA, trade liberaliza-
tion is a key ingredient in sparking the growth of the extensive margin, an important
source of new trade. Debaere and Mostashari (2010) ﬁnd a small eﬀect of trade lib-
eralization on the extensive margin of U.S. imports for the 1989–1999 and 1996–2006
periods.
I begin by providing a descriptive analysis of the evolution of exports of NAFTA
members in a novel way. As the main focus of the paper is the hazard of exports ceas-
ing, only data on newly created trade relationships can be used to evaluate it. In the
descriptive analysis I diﬀerentiate between new and old export relationships, where
old are all relationships active in 1990, the ﬁrst year in the data, while new are all
relationships created after 1990. After the descriptive analysis of new and old export
relationships, I present a simple motivating model along the lines of Melitz (2003)
and then estimate the hazard of exports ceasing.
I ﬁnd that exports of each NAFTA member to other members face a much lower
hazard of ceasing than their exports to non-members. The onset of NAFTA itself
has increased the hazard of Mexican and U.S. exports to fellow NAFTA members
ceasing and had no net eﬀect on the hazard of Canadian exports to other NAFTA
members ceasing. In terms of diﬀerences across the nature or returns to scale, exports
of increasing–returns–to–scale manufacturing products face the highest hazard in the
case of Canada and Mexico, while in the case of the U.S. that distinction belongs to
increasing–returns–to–scale natural resource products. Only in the case of Mexico are
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there signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the hazard for all three product types, with increasing–
returns–to–scale products having the lowest hazard.
The intra NAFTA exports of the three returns–to–scale product types are aﬀected
diﬀerently for each member by the onset of NAFTA. In the case of Canadian exports
NAFTA has increased the hazard for both increasing–returns–to–scale products, but
not in a statistically meaningful way. In the case of Mexico, NAFTA has had the
strongest eﬀect on the hazard of exports of IRS manufacturing products ceasing,
increasing it, while it did not increase the hazard exports of IRS natural resource
and CRS products ceasing in a statistically signiﬁcant manner. NAFTA has had the
strongest eﬀect on every returns–to–scale type product exported by the U.S., signif-
icantly increasing the hazard of exports of such products ceasing to other NAFTA
members, especially for both increasing returns to scale types. The eﬀect of NAFTA
has not been consistent over time, as it has increased the hazard in some three–year
periods after its onset and not in others.
The role of returns to scale and free trade agreements in duration of exports has
not been examined to date. Thus, this paper makes a contribution to the duration of
trade literature in addition to making a contribution to the literature on the eﬀects of
NAFTA. Duration of trade was ﬁrst examined by Besedesˇ and Prusa (2006a, 2006b)
who noted that most U.S. import relationships are short lived and that diﬀerentiated
products are exported to the U.S. in longer lasting relationships than homogeneous
goods. Besedesˇ (2008) showed that uncertainty in international trade and its eﬀect
on relationship formation as modeled by Rauch and Watson (2003) can account for
many features of duration data. Nitsch (2009) has found similar results for German
imports, while Brenton, Saborowski, von Uexkull (2010) and Fugazza and Molina
(2009) ﬁnd similar conclusions for a larger set of countries. Cadot et al. (2010)
for four African economies and Go¨rg, Kneller, and Murako¨zy (2008) for Hungary
reach similar conclusions for ﬁrm–level exports. Hess and Persson (2010a) examine
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duration of EU imports, while Besedesˇ examines how the hazard of exports ceasing
of Eastern European transition economies was aﬀected by the transition processes.
Jaud, Kukenova, and Stireborny (2009) examine the relationship between ﬁnancial
constraints and duration of trade. Besedesˇ and Prusa (2010) provide a summary of
the duration of trade literature.
2 Data
I use data on Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. export ﬂows recorded at the 6-digit
Harmonized Schedule (HS) level. Data for Canada and Mexico come from the UN
Comtrade database, while data for the U.S. were aggregated from 10-digit HS level
data available from the U.S. Census U.S. Exports CDs/DVDs. I use annual data
between 1990 and 2007 for all three countries. In each year I identify new export
relationships, converting annual data into spells of active exporting, and track them
until they cease to be active. A spell reﬂects the number of consecutive years during
which a relationship is active. A relationship is deﬁned as the instance of a coun-
try exporting a 6-digit HS product to another country, such as Mexican exports of
“Monumental/building stone, cut/sawn” (HS 680221) to Argentina, Australia, Bel-
gium, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and the U.S. among others.
To identify the production technology and the nature of returns to scale for each
product, I use the classiﬁcation developed by Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002). They iden-
tify four types of returns to scale: increasing–returns–to–scale (IRS) manufacturing,
increasing–returns–to–scale natural resources, constant–returns–to–scale (CRS), and
non–robust increasing–returns–to–scale industries for which they could not establish
the exact nature of the returns to scale. The latter group of industries are omitted
from the analysis. The share of export volumes and export relationships of products
with identiﬁed returns to scale varies across the three countries. Canada has some
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22% of its volume and a half of its relationships in products with robustly identiﬁed
returns to scale. Mexico has 40% of its volume and 44% of its relationships, while
the U.S. has 65% of volume and 59% of relationships in such products.
Canada Mexico U.S.
Annual observations All 559,942 311,881 2,250,343
New 416,970 253,713 1,165,839
Fraction new 0.75 0.81 0.52
Relationships All 140,215 71,082 356,969
New 116,046 61,990 240,942
Fraction new 0.83 0.87 0.68
Spells All 231,055 124,300 621,910
New 206,886 115,208 505,883
Fraction new 0.90 0.93 0.81
Table 1: Data Summary
Table 1 presents summary information for products with robustly identiﬁed re-
turns to scale for each country. Since I focus on exports created after 1990 the table
presents information for all exports as well as new exports. A note on the use of the
term ’new’ is in order – it refers to all export volumes or relationships created after
1990. For example, in 2005 new exports and relationships would be all those created
since 1990 and not only those created in 2005 alone. In all ﬁgures below old and
new values are normalized by the total 1990 values. Thus, values for new exports are
fractions of the 1990 value of total exports.
The U.S. has signiﬁcantly more annual observations, export relationships, and
spells of service than Canada and Mexico put together. Perhaps the largest diﬀerence
across the three countries is in the fraction of observations in exports created since
1990. While Canada and Mexico have 75% and 81% of all annual observations created
after 1990, the U.S. has almost a half of all of its observations started prior to 1990.
These diﬀerences decrease as one looks at export relationships, 83% and 87% for
Canada and Mexico and 68% for the U.S., and spells of service, 90% and 93% for
Canada and Mexico versus 81% for the U.S.
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2.1 New versus old exports
Figure 1 examines diﬀerences between exports started prior to 1990, old exports, and
those started afterwards, new exports. Top panels show the total volume of both
old and new exports, while bottom panels show the total number of both old and
new export relationships. For every country, new exports embody a signiﬁcantly
lower volume, with the diﬀerence the largest for Mexico. While old exports embody
more value, they also grow at a much slower rate than new exports. For Canada
the 1991–2007 growth rate of the volume of old exports is 141% and 1,512% for new
exports. For Mexico the corresponding ﬁgures are 727% and 2,172%, while for the
U.S. they are only 13% for old exports and 1,372% for new exports. By 2007 some
15% of all Canadian, 12% of all Mexican, and 16% of all U.S. exports are embodied
in relationships started since 1990.
While the top row of Figure 1 shows that new exports are signiﬁcantly smaller in
volume than old exports, the opposite is true for the number of export relationships
which carry that volume. The number of old relationships declines over time for
every country since their ranks cannot increase by deﬁnition. The rate of decline
from 1991 to 2007 is similar across the three countries: 66% for Canada and 57%
for both Mexico and the U.S. Both Canada and Mexico have slightly more than a
half of all relationships in 1991 in old exports, while the U.S. has almost 80% of its
relationships in old exports. Canada’s new relationships grow by 513%, followed by
Mexico at 469%, and the U.S. at 186%. While new exports account for a relatively
small share of total exports in 2007, new relationships account for a signiﬁcant number
of all relationships in 2007: 91% for Canada, 92% for Mexico, and 68% for the U.S.
A ﬁnal note on the growth in the number of relationships. The rate at which
new relationships are created exceeds the rate at which new relationships are ended.
This is true in almost every year for every country as the number of relationships
6
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started after 1990 grows in almost every year.1 These facts are supportive of the
broad conclusion of Besedesˇ and Prusa (2011), that, for at least some countries, the
extensive margin is relatively unimportant in the sense that over time it does not
account for much of the volume of exports, even though it accounts for a signiﬁcant
share of relationships. There is a lot of churning at the extensive margin in terms of
the number of relationships, but much less in terms of the volume.
2.2 Intra NAFTA export shares
Top panels in Figure 2 illustrate NAFTA shares of export volumes and relationships
embodied in old exports, while bottom panels shows NAFTA shares of new exports.
In every country much of the eﬀect of NAFTA is by far stronger in exports active in
1990. By 2000 almost 90% of Canada’s volume of exports was in old relationships
destined for Mexico and the U.S. The share of NAFTA destined old relationships
for Canada has quadrupled from 10% to 40%. Mexico has enjoyed an even stronger
dominance of NAFTA destined old exports, with the share of volume increasing to
more than 95% and the share of relationships increasing to 60%. The U.S. has the
most diversiﬁed structure of exports with the share of the volume of exports in old
relationships destined to NAFTA members doubling from 20% to 40% and the share
of relationships increasing by some two percentage points to 8%.
Patterns for new exports created after 1990 are more varied. While the share of
the volume of Canadian exports destined to NAFTA members has increased by a
factor of eight to 24%, the share of relationships displays an inverted U shape. For
Mexico the share of the volume has increased from 5% in 1991 to just under 20% by
2007, but having increased to as much as 40% in the intervening years. The share of
relationships was slightly lower in 2007 at roughly 6% than in 1991, but has increased
to as much as 9% in the intervening years. The decrease in both Canadian and
1The exceptions are 1996 for Canada; 1996, 1997, 2000, and 2001 for Mexico; and 1997, 1998,
2002, and 2007 for the U.S.
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Mexican exports to NAFTA members in the latter part of this period may have been
caused by the displacement of trade due to the rising presence of Chinese exports in
the U.S., as investigated by Iacovone, Rauch, and Winters (2010). The U.S. has had
the smallest share of new exports destined to NAFTA members, a consequence of a
more diversiﬁed export structure.
2.3 Export shares across returns to scale
In Figure 3 I examine the evolution of shares of export volumes and relationships
across the three types of returns to scale. While the majority of Canadian exports
involve IRS manufacturing products, they have experienced a fair amount of change
since 1990. The creation of CUSFTA resulted in a rapid drop in the share of IRS
manufacturing products from 80% of exports to 50% by 1994. The addition of Mexico
to CUSFTA resulted in an increase in the share of IRS manufacturing products to
60% which has trended back towards 50% by 2007. The share of exports in CRS
products more than doubled from 20% to 45% by 1994, but has trended downward
ever since. The share of IRS natural resource products has increased rapidly from
less than 5% of exports to almost 20% by 2007.
Mexico has had a diﬀerent experience. While the share of IRS manufacturing
products in exports has decreased to 55% immediately after NAFTA took eﬀect, it
has since increased to about 65%. The share of CRS products has decreased from
slightly more than 40% to about 30% after an initial boost from NAFTA. The share
of IRS natural resource products has increased consistently, though to a much lesser
degree than for Canada. The U.S. has a more balanced distribution of exports across
the three types of products. Unlike Canada and Mexico the U.S. has the largest
share of its exports in CRS products. Following CUSFTA the share of CRS products
decreased from 44% to 35% by 1995, followed by a sharp increase to 60% by 1999. It
has decreased steadily since to about 47% in 2007. The share of IRS manufacturing
10
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products has ﬂuctuated from some 40% in 1991 and 1995 and has decreased to some
25% in 2007. IRS natural resource products decreased from more than 30% in 1994
to less than 15% in 2001 before increasing to roughly 30% by 2007.
NAFTA members are more similar in the distribution of relationships. In every
country IRS manufacturing products account for the largest share of exports and
have followed rather similar paths. For all three the share of IRS natural resources
has been relatively stable over time, being the largest for the U.S. at some 5%. As a
result shares of IRS manufacturing and CRS products largely look as mirror images
of each other. IRS manufacturing has increased slightly in Canada, and somewhat
more for Mexico and the U.S., though the total increase in the share from 1991 to
2007 is only several percentage points.
2.4 Intra NAFTA export shares and returns to scale
There are larger ﬂuctuations in shares of exports destined for NAFTA members, as
seen in Figure 4. CRS products dominate the share of exports for each country.
For Canada, it has increased from some 40% in 1991 to almost 80% in 1995 before
collapsing to some 20% by 2007. For Mexico their share has ﬂuctuated between some
40% in both 1991 and 2007 and more than 60% reached on several occasions. In the
U.S. their share has steadily increased from less than 40% to more than 75% by 2007.
Canada’s exports of IRS manufacturing goods rapidly decreased with the forma-
tion of CUSFTA from almost 60% in 1991 to less than 20% in 1995 before rebounding
under NAFTA to more than 30% in the early 2000s and settling at some 25% in 2007.
The share of IRS manufacturing products in Mexico’s exports to NAFTA members
has decreased from 60% to around 40%, while their share in U.S. exports to NAFTA
members has decreased from some 60% to around 20%. IRS natural resource prod-
ucts share in Canadian exports increased rapidly between 1991 and 1992, decreased
as rapidly by 1995, and ﬁnally increased to more than 50%, dominating Canadian
12
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exports by 2007. In Mexico’s exports the share of IRS natural resource products in-
creased modestly until 2005 when they enjoyed a rapid increase to almost 20%. Their
share in U.S. exports has remained largely constant and small.
Fluctuations have been much smaller in the distribution of relationships. The
share of IRS natural resource product relationships has remained steady at or below
10% for all three NAFTA members. The share of CRS product relationships in
Canadian exports to NAFTA has increased from 50% to more than 60% in the late
1990s before returning to some 50%. The share of IRS manufacturing products has
mirrored that of CRS products, ﬁrst decreasing from 60% before returning to that
level by 2007. The share of CRS product relationships in Mexican exports to NAFTA
members has ﬂuctuated around 50% and that of IRS manufacturing has ﬂuctuated
around 45%. The U.S. oﬀers a diﬀerent picture with CRS products relationships
accounting for a roughly constant 75% share of relationships and IRS manufacturing
products accounting for a roughly constant 18%.
3 Motivating Model
To motivate the estimation of the hazard exports ceasing consider the following ex-
tension of the Melitz (2003) model. Firms are subject to exogenous productivity or
product appeal shocks, μ, which are serially correlated over time. Firms that draw a
favorable parameter μ, one above the threshold required for exporting to be proﬁtable,
will export. The length of the ﬁrm’s participation in export markets will depend on
the nature of the correlation of the ﬁrm’s μ over time. If the correlation is positive,
so that μ increases over time, the ﬁrm will be a long–lived exporter. If the ﬁrm’s μ is
negatively correlated over time, then the ﬁrm will cease exporting at some point. How
quickly the ﬁrm’s μ falls below the level required for proﬁtable exports will depend
on the rate of decrease in μ and its initial level. A favorably large initial μ my not
14
result in the ﬁrm being a long–lived exporter if μ decreases quickly over time. On the
ﬂip side, a ﬁrm whose initial μ is favorable, but close to the export threshold level,
may turn into a long–lived exporter provided its μ is positively correlated over time.
Clearly, an initial μ close to the threshold level coupled with negative correlation over
time will result in the ﬁrm quickly ceasing exporting. Thus, depending on the level of
the initial μ and its correlation over time, one might observe ﬁrms of varying duration
of exporting.
A free trade agreement aﬀects ﬁrms through its eﬀect on μ. Free access to a
foreign market can either be attributed to a positive productivity shock or a positive
product appeal shock as it reduces costs of supplying a market. NAFTA may have had
a diﬀerential eﬀect based on the nature of the returns to scale used in production.
Trade models with economies of scale argue that access to a large foreign market
increases ﬁrm productivity as Treﬂer (2004) has found for NAFTA. This would entail
an increase in the parameter μ, thus making it more likely ﬁrms would both start
exporting and export longer, even if their μ is negatively correlated over time. Thus,
NAFTA can reduce the hazard of exports ceasing. NAFTA may have had an oﬀsetting
eﬀect as well, as some ﬁrms may be induced to try to export, even though they should
not. Some ﬁrms may be overly optimistic about their ability to successfully export
and attempt to do so only to ﬁnd themselves abandoning exports quickly. The overall
eﬀect of NAFTA can therefore be seen as a the balance of these two opposing forces.
4 Hazard of Exports Ceasing
4.1 Econometric methodology and speciﬁcation
I estimate the hazard of exports ceasing by estimating a probit model. As argued
by Hess and Persson (2010b), using a probit estimator is more appropriate for dis-
crete duration data, as annual trade data are, and does not impose the restrictive
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proportional hazard assumption.2 Unobserved heterogeneity is another reason to use
a discrete–time model such as probit to estimate the hazard as it is more easily
addressed in such models than in the Cox proportional hazard model. To take unob-
served heterogeneity into account I estimate the random eﬀects probit model of the
hazard rate with random eﬀects at the spell level. I model the dependence of the
hazard rate on time by including a dummy for each year in the spell.
Advantages of the probit–estimated hazard model comes at the cost of a more
complicated interpretation of estimated coeﬃcients. Neither coeﬃcients nor the asso-
ciated marginal eﬀects reveal the true eﬀect of each covariate. Although a given coef-
ﬁcient may be statistically signiﬁcant, whether it makes a diﬀerence for the estimated
hazard depends on the standard error of every covariate, all pairwise covariances, and
the distributional speciﬁcation of the probit model. To ascertain whether estimated
hazards for diﬀerent values of covariates of interest are statistically diﬀerent I plot
estimated hazards with the 95% conﬁdence interval, which is denoted with dotted line
in every ﬁgure. All estimated hazards are estimated with covariates at their mean
levels, with the exception of covariates of interest.
I use several country– and product–level variables to estimate the hazard of ex-
ports ceasing. The gross domestic product of the importer is expected to reduce the
hazard, while distance to the importer is expected to increase the hazard. I use two
measures of common language; one capturing whether two countries share an oﬃcial
language and the other whether more than 9% of the population speak the same lan-
guage. In as much as common language reduces costs, both are expected to reduce
the hazard. I use two measures at the country–product level to capture information
spillovers: one measures the number of products exported to the same country, while
the other measures the number of countries to which the same product is exported.
2Brenton, Saborowski, and von Uexku¨ll (2010) and Hess and Persson (2010b) show that the
assumption of proportional hazards is not satisﬁed in annual trade data. Hess and Persson (2010b)
examine several other estimators which relax the proportionality assumption and recommend that
probit be used.
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The former measures experience with a country, while the latter measures experience
with a product. Both are expected to reduce the hazard.
A lower economic risk of the importer is expected to reduce the hazard. The
volume of initial exports should reduce the hazard, reﬂecting the conﬁdence exporters
(or their importing partners) have in their ability to consistently export their products
(Rauch and Watson 2003, Besedesˇ 2008). The coeﬃcient of variation of unit values
measures the extent of the variation of unit values for each product across all export
destinations. It reﬂects the extent of product diﬀerentiation. I use a dummy to
capture any colonial relationship in the past. Finally, I use dummies to capture each
multiple instance of a relationship.
I use two dummies to capture the eﬀect of returns to scale, one for IRS manu-
facturing products and one for IRS natural resource products with CRS products as
the baseline. Since spells of export relationships created after 1990 stretch across the
period prior to and after the establishment of NAFTA, it is possible to distinguish
between two NAFTA related eﬀects. Therefore, I use two dummies. One simply cap-
tures exports to NAFTA members, while the other captures whether NAFTA itself
is in eﬀect. Estimates of these four dummies are of main interest.
4.2 Basic results
Table 2 collects the basic results. Most variables have identical qualitative eﬀects
across all three exporters. Similar to other papers in the literature, the larger the
GDP of the importer the lower the hazard for both Canadian and U.S. exports. The
eﬀect of importer’s GDP on the hazard of Mexican exports is positive – Mexican
exports to larger economies face a higher hazard. To the extent that Mexican exports
to larger and more developed economies are potentially of lower quality may result
in them experiencing a higher hazard than exports to smaller economies.
The economic risk variable oﬀers a somewhat puzzling result. With higher values
17
Canada Mexico U.S.
GDP (ln) -0.014*** 0.045*** -0.047***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Economic risk (ln) -0.040 0.108*** -0.072***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.012)
Initial exports (ln) -0.048*** -0.086*** -0.120***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Partners by product (ln) -0.439*** -0.531*** -0.705***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Products by partners (ln) -0.269*** -0.360*** -0.437***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Cov unit values (ln) 0.028*** -0.009*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Distance (ln) 0.047*** -0.092*** 0.096***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.006)
Common language (oﬃcial) 0.006 -0.069** -0.034***
(0.015) (0.028) (0.006)
Common language (minority) -0.021 -0.020 -0.026**
(0.017) (0.025) (0.010)
Colonial relationship 0.104*** 0.073*** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
IRS Manufacturing -0.002 -0.107** 0.096***
(0.018) (0.043) (0.010)
IRS Natural resources -0.270*** -0.858*** -1.011***
(0.054) (0.066) (0.073)
NAFTA members -0.028* 0.058** -0.052***
(0.016) (0.028) (0.006)
NAFTA in eﬀect 0.034 0.129*** 0.168**
(0.057) (0.048) (0.075)
Constant 3.549*** 3.423*** 7.829***
(0.114) (0.146) (0.090)
Observations 187,188 168,642 667,787
Spells 103,851 81,732 292,694
Log-Likelihood -101,025 -91,296 -376,942
ρ 0.022*** 0.190*** 0.204***
Year in spell FE Y Y Y
Spell number FE Y Y Y
Robust standard errors clustered by relationships in parentheses with *, **,
*** denoting signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Table 2: Hazard Estimates
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indicating a riskier economy, a negative coeﬃcient implies that U.S. exports to riskier
economies face a lower hazard, rather than a higher one as one might expect. This
result highlights the presence of uncertainty in international trade as modeled by
Rauch and Watson (2003) and empirically investigated by Besedesˇ (2008). It is
possible exports to highly uncertain economies are undertaken only once the exporter
is relatively certain its exports will be long lived and will generate a proﬁt. Such
a strategy minimizes costs associated with exporting especially in situations where
there is uncertainty as to whether exports will be proﬁtable. Economic risk has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on Canadian exports, while Mexican exports face a lower hazard
when destined for less risky markets, as expected.
The volume of exports at the start of a relationship has a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect for all three countries resulting in longer lived spells for relationships starting
with a larger volume. Information spillovers have large negative eﬀects – the more
products exported to a country or the more countries a product is exported to, the
lower the hazard. Both of these results are consistent with Cadot et al. (2010) and
Besedesˇ (2011). The more variable are the unit values for Canadian and U.S. exports
the higher the hazard. The eﬀect for Mexican exports is the opposite, with more
variable unit values resulting in a lower hazard.
To the extent that distance reﬂects transportation costs, the further away the
export markets are the higher the hazard of Canadian and U.S. exports, as expected.
For Mexico the eﬀect is the opposite – hazard is lower for exports destined for markets
further away from Mexico. Oﬃcial common language has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
for Canadian and U.S. exports resulting in a reduced hazard. Mexican exports to
countries with Spanish as the oﬃcial language face a higher hazard. The minority
common language has a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect for Mexico and the
U.S., indicating longer duration and lower hazard, while it has no eﬀect on Canadian
exports. Exports to countries with which Canada and Mexico share a colonial history
19
are no diﬀerent form exports to other countries, while in the case of the U.S. such
exports face a lower hazard.
The relative importance of unobserved heterogeneity is reﬂected by estimates of ρ,
which can be interpreted as the fraction of individual spell variation due to variation
in unobserved factors. There are large diﬀerences in unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween Canada on one side and Mexico and the U.S. on the other. While unobserved
heterogeneity plays a statistically signiﬁcant role in all three cases, the magnitude of
ρ is almost an order of magnitude larger in the case of Mexico and the U.S. (0.190
and 0.204 versus 0.022).
4.3 Eﬀects of NAFTA
Exports to a NAFTA member face a signiﬁcantly lower hazard for all three countries,
with the eﬀect strongest for the U.S. and weakest for Canada. Surprisingly, the
establishment of NAFTA increased the hazard of Mexican and U.S. exports destined
to NAFTA markets, while it has no eﬀect on Canadian exports. To properly evaluate
whether NAFTA has had a signiﬁcant eﬀect, I plot the estimated hazard of exports
ceasing for non–NAFTA members and for NAFTA members both in the absence and
presence of NAFTA in Figure 5. I include the 95% conﬁdence interval around the
estimated hazard for non–members and members in the absence of NAFTA. If the
estimated hazard for members in the presence of NAFTA lies outside the conﬁdence
interval, then NAFTA has had a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
The hazard of exports to NAFTA members ceasing is lower than to non-NAFTA
countries for all three members with diﬀerences statistically signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence
between the hazard of exports ceasing to NAFTA members and non–members is
the largest for Mexico and the U.S. The pure eﬀect of joining NAFTA is slightly
positive for Canada, increasing the hazard, but is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
enactment of NAFTA has a much larger eﬀect for Mexico and the U.S., increasing
20
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the hazard of exports to NAFTA members ceasing. In addition, the estimated hazard
for exports ceasing to NAFTA members with NAFTA in eﬀect lies outside the 95%
conﬁdence interval (dotted lines) for the estimated hazard for exports ceasing to
NAFTA members, with the diﬀerence larger for U.S. exports.
The onset of NAFTA has increased the hazard of exports to member countries
ceasing in the case of Mexico and the U.S. In neither case is this increase suﬃciently
large to oﬀset the lower hazard associated with exporting to a NAFTA member. One
explanation for the NAFTA eﬀect is that its establishment may have induced too
many ﬁrms to try to take advantage of new opportunities created by NAFTA, thus
resulting in more failures. Essentially, NAFTA may have induced some ﬁrms who
otherwise would not export to do so, only to quickly realize they cannot compete in
the foreign market.
4.4 Eﬀects of returns to scale
In terms of returns to scale, exports of increasing–returns–to–scale manufacturing
products face a higher hazard than constant–returns–to–scale products for Canadian,
Mexican, and U.S. exports. U.S. exports of increasing–returns–to–scale natural re-
source products face a higher hazard, while Mexican exports of IRS natural resource
products face a signiﬁcantly lower hazard than their exports of CRS products. There
are no diﬀerences between the two types of products in the case of Canadian exports.
Figure 6 illustrates estimated hazard for the three types of returns to scale for
each country, along with corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals. There are virtually
no diﬀerences between CRS and IRS natural resource products for Canada, while
its exports of IRS manufacturing products face a statistically diﬀerent and higher
hazard. In the case of Mexico, IRS manufacturing products also face a statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent and highest hazard of exports ceasing. Mexican exports of
IRS natural resource products face the lowest hazard. Diﬀerences between the three
22
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returns to scale type products for Mexico are statistically diﬀerent, especially for
the ﬁrst few years in a spell. The ordering of estimated hazards is diﬀerent for the
U.S. with IRS natural resource products facing the highest hazard of exports ceasing,
which is statistically diﬀerent from the other two types. While IRS manufacturing
products exported by the U.S. face a higher hazard, it is not statistically diﬀerent
from that for CRS products.
4.5 The eﬀect of NAFTA over time
To better understand the nature of the eﬀect of the implementation of NAFTA on
the hazard of exports ceasing, Table 3 shows the results with the NAFTA–in–eﬀect
variable having a time–dependent eﬀect, for three–year intervals starting in 1994. It
is possible NAFTA has had a diﬀerent eﬀect over time as ﬁrms adjust to it and since
some of its provisions were phased in over a period of time.3 Since the coeﬃcients for
other variables are virtually unchanged, I only present the coeﬃcients for the time–
dependent NAFTA–in–eﬀect variable.4 These four dummies indicate in which years
did the existence of NAFTA aﬀects the hazard.
While the onset of NAFTA has no net eﬀect on Canadian exports, the time–
dependent coeﬃcients indicate that the onset of NAFTA did increase the hazard of
Canadian exports to the other two NAFTA members immediately after the onset
of NAFTA and had no eﬀect after 1997. The opposite holds for Mexico: there is
no eﬀect in the ﬁrst three years of Mexican participation in NAFTA, while in every
subsequent three–year period exports to other NAFTA members face a signiﬁcantly
higher hazard. U.S. exports to NAFTA members face a higher hazard consistently
since the onset of NAFTA, with the exception of the three–year period between 1997
and 1999.
3Baier and Bergstrand (2007) show in a gravity framework that the full eﬀect of free trade
agreements on the partners’ trade volume takes ten years to accrue.
4Full results are available on request.
24
Canada Mexico U.S.
NAFTA members -0.267*** -0.858*** -1.012***
(0.055) (0.066) (0.073)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1994–1996 0.201*** 0.021 0.170**
(0.071) (0.055) (0.086)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1997–1998 -0.058 0.171*** 0.067
(0.074) (0.054) (0.086)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2000–2002 -0.063 0.241*** 0.320***
(0.067) (0.055) (0.084)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2003–2005 0.050 0.111** 0.107
(0.061) (0.055) (0.086)
ρ 0.0228*** 0.184*** 0.204***
Robust standard errors clustered by relationships in parentheses with *, **,
*** denoting signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%; year in spell and spell number
ﬁxed eﬀects included.
Table 3: Time–Dependent NAFTA Eﬀect
Figure 7 plots the estimated hazard for exports to NAFTA members in absence
of NAFTA with the 95% conﬁdence interval along with estimated hazards for the
four subperiods. In the case of Canada, the eﬀect of NAFTA between 1994 and 1996
is outside the conﬁdence interval indicating that during those three years NAFTA
did indeed increase the hazard of Canadian exports to NAFTA members ceasing. In
the case of Mexico, the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant between 1997 and 2002, while
the eﬀect between 2003 and 2005 lies just inside the 95% conﬁdence interval. In the
case of the U.S., NAFTA had a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect immediately upon its
inception, between 1994 and 1996, and again between 2000 and 2002 when it increased
the hazard signiﬁcantly (by almost ten percentage points at the start of a spell).
4.6 NAFTA and returns to scale
I have argued above that one might expect the hazard of exports ceasing for increasing–
returns–to–scale manufacturing products to be the lowest when destined to NAFTA
markets given advantages oﬀered by access to larger markets. The above results that
IRS manufacturing products face the highest hazard are potentially indicative of the
opposite holding. However, the appropriate examination of such a hypothesis entails
25
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comparing the hazard of exports to NAFTA members ceasing for each returns–to–
scale product separately, to which I now turn. Rather than introducing a number of
interacted variables to examine whether the eﬀect of NAFTA is diﬀerent for diﬀerent
returns–to–scale products, I estimate the hazard of exports ceasing for each of the
three returns–to–scale types of products, focusing on the NAFTA–in–eﬀect coeﬃ-
cients, and compare the ﬁtted hazards for each country. In order to conserve space I
only present coeﬃcients relevant to NAFTA.5 Table 4 collects the results.
Canada
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.263*** -0.274*** -0.176***
(0.066) (0.086) (0.059)
NAFTA in eﬀect 0.076 0.164* 0.033
(0.069) (0.089) (0.061)
ρ 0.0315*** 0.0259*** 0.0299***
Mexico
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.703*** -0.624*** -0.773***
(0.063) (0.090) (0.067)
NAFTA in eﬀect 0.182*** 0.082 0.025
(0.049) (0.071) (0.049)
ρ 0.161*** 0.174*** 0.203***
United States
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -1.097*** -1.042*** -1.029***
(0.116) (0.126) (0.076)
NAFTA in eﬀect 0.431*** 0.457*** 0.195***
(0.120) (0.130) (0.078)
ρ 0.119*** 0.135*** 0.239***
Robust standard errors clustered by relationships in parentheses with *, **, *** de-
noting signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%; year in spell and spell number ﬁxed eﬀects
included.
Table 4: The Eﬀect of NAFTA across Returns to Scale
Intra–NAFTA exports of all three countries in all three returns–to–scale types
face a lower hazard. In the case of Canada, the onset of NAFTA has no signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on the hazard of exports increasing–returns–to–scale manufacturing and
5Full results are available on request.
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constant–returns–to–scale products ceasing, and only marginally increases the haz-
ard for increasing–returns–to–scale natural resource products. In the case of Mexico,
the net eﬀect of NAFTA which was to increase the hazard associated with exports to
NAFTA members (see Table 2) seems to be driven by its eﬀect on increasing–returns–
to–scale manufacturing products. The other two types are not aﬀected by the onset
of NAFTA. In the case of the U.S., the onset of NAFTA increases the hazard for all
three types of returns to scale.
Figure 8 shows the estimated hazard of exports to NAFTA members ceasing for
the diﬀerent types of returns to scale and the eﬀect of NAFTA on the estimated
hazard. I include the 95% conﬁdence interval for the estimated hazard of exports to
NAFTA members ceasing. The top panels examine increasing–returns–to–scale man-
ufacturing products, the middle panels increasing–returns–to–scale natural resource
products, and the bottom panels constant–returns–to–scale products. In the case of
Canadian exports, despite the fact that the eﬀect of the onset of NAFTA is esti-
mated as signiﬁcant, the estimated hazard for the onset of NAFTA is not statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that for exports to NAFTA members, with the possible
exception of IRS natural resource products.
In the case of Mexico NAFTA does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the hazard for
IRS natural resource and CRS products, as the two estimated hazard are within the
95% conﬁdence interval. However, the eﬀect of NAFTA is statistically signiﬁcant for
IRS manufacturing products. The largest eﬀect that NAFTA has had on the hazard of
exports ceasing is for U.S. products across the full spectrum of returns to scale. In the
case of each returns–to–scale product type, the diﬀerence between exports to NAFTA
members in the absence of NAFTA and after its onset is statistically signiﬁcant. Thus,
NAFTA has increased the hazard of U.S. exports to NAFTA members ceasing, by
almost ten percentage points at the start of a spell in the case of IRS products and
some ﬁve percentage points in the case of CRS products.
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Canada
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.260*** -0.271*** -0.173***
(0.066) (0.086) (0.059)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1994–1996 0.283*** 0.371*** 0.192**
(0.086) (0.112) (0.077)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1997–1998 0.006 0.110 0.022
(0.088) (0.114) (0.079)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2000–2002 -0.093 -0.065 -0.103
(0.079) (0.104) (0.072)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2003–2005 0.110 0.227** 0.048
(0.072) (0.095) (0.066)
ρ 0.0318*** 0.0259*** 0.0306***
Mexico
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.703*** -0.626*** -0.774***
(0.063) (0.090) (0.067)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1994–1996 0.110* -0.040 -0.136**
(0.056) (0.082) (0.057)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1997–1998 0.214*** 0.088 0.044
(0.056) (0.080) (0.056)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2000–2002 0.325*** 0.289*** 0.196***
(0.057) (0.080) (0.056)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2003–2005 0.098* 0.004 0.021
(0.057) (0.082) (0.057)
ρ 0.159*** 0.168*** 0.193***
United States
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -1.092*** -1.041*** -1.035***
(0.116) (0.126) (0.076)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1994–1996 0.525*** 0.463*** 0.135
(0.137) (0.151) (0.090)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1997–1998 0.244* 0.500*** 0.115
(0.138) (0.148) (0.089)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2000–2002 0.637*** 0.610*** 0.385***
(0.134) (0.147) (0.087)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2003–2005 0.270* 0.232 0.146
(0.139) (0.152) (0.089)
ρ 0.118*** 0.135*** 0.238***
Robust standard errors clustered by relationships in parentheses with *, **, *** denoting signiﬁ-
cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%; year in spell and spell number ﬁxed eﬀects included.
Table 5: Time–Dependent Eﬀect of NAFTA across Returns to Scale
30
Table 5 contains the time–dependent eﬀects of NAFTA for each returns to scale
type, shedding more light on the exact nature of the eﬀect of NAFTA on the hazard of
exports ceasing. For Canada, NAFTA has increased the hazard of IRS manufacturing
and CRS products only during its ﬁrst three years, while the hazard IRS natural
resource products was higher in the ﬁrst three years as well as between 2003 and
2005. This is conﬁrmed by plots in Figure 9 where the estimated hazard during these
periods is outside the 95% conﬁdence interval.
For Mexico, NAFTA has increased the hazard for IRS manufacturing products
consistently ever since it was enacted, though the eﬀect has declined in magnitude
after 2002. The eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant for the 1997 to 2002 period, and only
marginally so for the other two periods (Figure 9). NAFTA has increased the hazard
for IRS natural resource products only between 2000 and 2002, which is statistically
signiﬁcant as illustrated in Figure 9. NAFTA’s eﬀect on the hazard of Mexican exports
of CRS products is the most varied. It has initially reduced it with the estimated
hazard right on the lower bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval, and then increased
it between 1997 and 2002, a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. NAFTA has had no eﬀect
since 2003.
NAFTA’s eﬀect on the hazard of U.S. exports to NAFTA members is the most
consistent one, having increased the hazard for every type of product in almost every
year. Exports of CRS products have a higher hazard of ceasing in a statistically
meaningful manner only for the 2000–2002 period. Exports of IRS natural resource
products have had a higher hazard in every period, with diﬀerences statistically sig-
niﬁcant, though only marginally for the 2003–2005 period. Exports of IRS manufac-
turing products had a statistically signiﬁcant higher hazard in every period, with the
eﬀect stronger immediately after NAFTA’s onset and between 2000 and 2002.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate how the North American Free Trade Agreement has af-
fected the members’ hazard of exports ceasing and how diﬀerences in returns to scale
manifest themselves in the hazard of exports ceasing for the three members: Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. NAFTA itself has not had a beneﬁcial eﬀect on the
hazard of exports ceasing. Rather, the eﬀect has been negative for the U.S. and Mex-
ico, with the hazard of their exports ceasing to NAFTA members increasing with the
enactment of NAFTA. However, the said increase was not large enough to oﬀset the
much lower hazard of exports ceasing to NAFTA members enjoy due to the geography
of the free–trade area and proximity of the members to each other. Canada, Mexico,
and the U.S. enjoy a signiﬁcantly lower hazard on exports to each other without the
presence of NAFTA. Given the particular geography of NAFTA, the eﬀect of common
borders between the members, a well known positive force in international trade, is
largely indistinguishable from the eﬀect of NAFTA. The nature of the geography of
NAFTA makes it diﬃcult to broadly conclude that free trade agreements increase
the hazard of exports between the members ceasing, calling for an investigation of
the eﬀect of free trade agreements with less restrictive geographic characteristics, or
a broader set of such agreements.
The eﬀect of NAFTA is much stronger once one scratches below the surface, in
terms of evaluating its eﬀect on each returns to scale type. It has had the most
consistent eﬀect on U.S. exports of all three types, particularly in the case of both
increasing returns to scale product types. In addition, it has had diﬀerent eﬀects
during diﬀerent subperiods since its inception, likely reﬂecting the ability of ﬁrms to
adjust to new conditions and the fact that some of its provisions were phased in over
time.
I presented the ﬁrst evidence of the eﬀect of a free trade agreement on the hazard of
exports ceasing. While NAFTA increases the hazard, further investigation is needed
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with free trade agreements among countries which are not as geographically clustered
as the NAFTA members are. Mercosur and the European Union are two free trade
areas which oﬀer a diﬀerent geography which could shed additional results on the role
of a free trade agreement. In addition, I presented the ﬁrst evidence on the eﬀect of
the returns to scale on the hazard of exports ceasing. Unlike diﬀerences along the
product diﬀerentiation dimension, which are largely consistent across a number of
countries, the identiﬁed eﬀects of returns to scale are exporter speciﬁc. Since these
results are based on three exporters only, additional investigation of other countries
is warranted.
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A Data Appendix
Data used in this paper are available from public sources.
Data Source
U.S. exports U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Imports CDs and DVDs
Canadian and Mexican UN Comtrade
exports
GDP World Bank’s World Development Indicators
Distance, contiguity, common CEPII
language and colonial http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm
history
Returns to Scale classiﬁcation Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002)
Economic Risk International Risk Guide
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx
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